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Abstract 
The progressive digitization of the energy infrastructure in the course of the energy evolution 
requires reliable cybersecurity equipment that does not solely rely on access restrictions any more. 
For powerplants even frequently supplying fixes for vulnerabilities is not sufficient. One approach 
to repel attacks is the analysis of semantical and syntactical properties data of the communicated. 
For a fast detection of successful attacks the relations between parameters of control circuits can 
be evaluated. To ensure the security of our future energy system, the purpose of our work is to 
develop and establish independent, suitable monitoring systems within all components. 
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Introduction 
For the energy evolution in Germany, the entire energy infrastructure is being rebuilt with power 
plants using renewable energy sources. A large number of small, decentralized power stations are 
replacing the large central power stations step by step. The fluctuating availability of renewable 
energy sources, as well as the increased energy demand due to mobility applications and the re-
sulting higher fluctuations in demand, result in the need for much higher degrees of freedom in 
the network infrastructure. The large number of components requires intelligent remote control 
from a central position. The information network for control of those new plants, controllable 
transformers, prosumers etc. is called smart grid as it consists of smart devices. [3] Due to the 
high number of components interconnected in the smart grid and their spatial distribution, exten-
sive protection against hacker attacks is required for such a control. In classical power plants, 
security is ensured primarily through the restriction of physical access or access rights. For high 
voltage transformers there is a dedicated optical fiber network. However, many examples from 
the past show that for smaller systems, far too often even the simplest access restrictions, e.g. 
password protection, are missing. But even if the usual protective measures have been taken, 
targeted attacks can rarely be repelled.  
A current approach based on the concept of physical access restriction uses the so-called ‘power-
line’ network in which the communication is transmitted directly via the power line. Although 
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this network is not directly connected to the Internet, the power lines are accessible in every 
household by smart devices. Due to the large number of systems that would have to be integrated, 
however, threads from network vulnerabilities also encounters any possible independent, dedi-
cated network.  
Another approach based on informational access restriction uses cryptographic methods. A per-
fect implementation would lead to a huge increase of security in communication, as all connected 
devices can be identified and the data cannot be manipulated. Unfortunately there are always 
vulnerabilities caused by implementation faults and it does not protect from an attack that dupli-
cates valid data or delays it in time. 
It is therefore necessary to establish mechanisms which ensure the security of the system, regard-
less of access restrictions. 
About Smart Grids 
The main difference between conventional and smart grids is that the latter ones include cyber 
devices based on software functionality. The quick development of different technologies in the 
industrial field as well as in the home area increases the electricity requirement dramatically. 
Thus, use of various sources of energy, especially renewable ones is becoming a necessity con-
sidering new legislation and increasing energy consumption. Several factors allowed the devel-
opment of smart grids over conventional energy systems. The main reasons of the advent of smart 
grids are described below. 
 Providing a low-cost energy source thanks to the adjustment ability of a dynamic pricing 
system based on the consumption information, 
 Respecting the imposed environmental regulations and standards, 
 Renovating the aging infrastructures in traditional power grids, 
 Resistance to disturbances and quick recovery from them [7]. 
In a nutshell, the main promise of smart grids is to provide a low-cost and an outage-free source 
of energy for the future [14]. 
Vulnerabilities in Smart Grids 
The use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in smart grids (SG) allows the 
interaction between the different parties and stations involved in energy generation, transmission 
and distribution processes. Communication networks used in the modern SG may however raise 
different security concerns. 
Smart grids are considered as critical infrastructures which makes ensuring security one of the 
major concerns. The presence of different vulnerabilities inherent in the structure of a smart grid 
make ensuring its security even more challenging. Some of the main weaknesses encountered 
while ensuring the security and the safety of the SG are summarized in the following points. 
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 The use of a massive number of devices including intelligent ones in the SG may result in 
the increase of the possible vulnerable points. Smart meters for instance can be maliciously 
used to indirectly influence the whole power plant. 
 The coexistence of short-lived IT systems and legacy devices may result in incompatibilities 
and raise security concerns. 
 An implicit trust is adopted for device-to-device communication also called machine to 
machine (M2M). This can affect the control system and make it vulnerable mainly to data 
spoofing as the state of one device alters the functionality of another [1]. 
 The growth of the number of stakeholders in modern smart grids leads to new threats such as 
insider attacks. 
 The adaption of network protocols found in general computer systems to power plants 
implies the same threats encountered in the former systems. 
 Almost all usual software contains weaks or faults in the implementation that lead to 
significant vulnerabilities [6]. 
Countermeasures against Smart Grids Cyber Threats 
Traditional solutions against cyber-attacks in smart grids were adapted from the ICT field such 
as access restrictions. However, those methods are not adequate for application to the smart grid 
due to its specificities. In fact, in a critical infrastructure such as a smart grid, availability, integrity 
and certain levels of confidentiality are required in this order of priority [9]. 
To harden the cybersecurity of the modern energy systems against attacks several techniques 
ranging from firewalls to intrusion detection and prevention tools are used. Industrial protocols 
used in smart grids such as Modbus TCP or DNP3, for the most do not have integrated network 
security solutions. Attacks such as DoS or DDoS, MIM (Man-in-the-middle) can have disastrous 
consequences as shown by the reported accidents in the few last years.  
Consistent work on developing intrusion detection systems has been done. High rates of intrusion 
detection with low rates of false positive were reached. Jyothi et al. in [5] claim reaching a detec-
tion rate of DDoS attacks of 99.8 % and a false alarm rate of 0 % using BRAIN, a behaviour based 
intrusion detection tool that uses an algorithm that combines low-level hardware events, network 
statistics and application parameters. Many researchers claim reaching such high rate of detection, 
however they rarely consider latency detection [10]. In fact, time is a decisive factor in the case 
of a cyber-attack affecting a critical infrastructure such as a SG. If an intrusion detection system 
has a high detection latency, the target could be damaged before the intrusion is detected. 
An approach that enables the detection of intrusions within a reasonable time in a first stage and 
their prevention in a second one is highly needed to secure the network communication in smart 
grids. The semantic and syntactic checking of the data transmitted within the network of the smart 
grid is a promising approach to protect this critical infrastructure mainly against availability at-
tacks. Further work will focus on developing solutions to reach this goal.  
Jahrestagung KIT-Zentrum Energie 2017 
118 
Cybersecurity of energy systems, a model-based approach  
The detection of attacks requires in most cases prior knowledge of the weak points of the com-
puter system or knowledge of the behavior of the malicious software. In the current systems new 
vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered, for which the signatures for the detection and the 
necessary fixes are provided in the form of updates. However, for energy infrastructure as a crit-
ical infrastructure, these updates are often applied only after years, because every change to the 
system has to be validated by extensive tests [4]. 
In order to recognize a successful attack regardless of its signature knowledge about the inter-
operation of the components in the affected system is necessary.  
The plants are equipped with a standard system that detects states which could cause damage to 
the plant and trigger an emergency shutdown. The usual protection systems, as they are used in 
most facilities, define independent expectation intervals for all measured values. If a value ex-
ceeds such an interval, the system is switched off. The exact deviation, i.e. direction and magni-
tude, enables conclusions in cause of a known malfunction but lacks information to classify an 
unknown malfunction [8, 13]. Protection against artificial attacks is rarely possible because the 
independence of the intervals provides sufficient margins for manipulations that will not be de-
tected. Even without an attack some plants were damaged in the past despite those protection 
systems [12]. For the detection, the preprocessed data from smart sensors are used, so the sensors 
themselves can be manipulated. Manipulations which do not lead to a damage, such as the reduc-
tion of the requested power, are not recognized by these systems at all.  
In addition, these security systems enable new possibilities of attack. In order to take the plant off 
the grid, only a prohibited operating state has to be emulated or physically reached by the attacker. 
Also this is no problem for a single plant, it is risky for the power system as all components are 
connected and accessible with standardized communication. Thus a specific manipulation could 
apply to multiple plants and therefore take entire groups of plants off the grid.  
The idea considered in the following is to introduce an independent monitoring system, which 
checks the control circuits for invalid behaviour and in future systems validates the measured 
system states with a minimum number of additional, reliable measurements. The correlations be-
tween the different control and measured variables as well as their derivatives can be condensed 
from the existing models of the plants.  
For a quick fix of the malfunction, additional information about the component which is most 
likely the tampered one, is helpful. In addition to the fast recommissioning of the affected plant 
function, this knowledge could also be used to test identical components in other systems. There-
fore the aim is a classification of the malfunctions, which is independent from the knowledge of 
the signature of the specific malfunction.  
The following methods are investigated on the Simulink model of a wind turbine [2]. The actua-
ting variable is the requested power from which the control calculates a set point for the pitch 
angle depending on the measured supplied power. The wind is then the mediating parameter, and 
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changes of the wind can be considered a disturbance that affects the system. The requested power 
is 3 MW in the unmanipulated case.  
A method presently used in industrial plants is the simulation during runtime with the measured 
conditions. The values calculated by the simulation can either be compared directly to the mea- 
sured ones or individual features can be compared. Since the behavior of the systems is described 
much more precisely here, this approach is more suitable for the detection of an attack than in the 
comparison with intervals. As for the intervals the deviations between measurements and simu-
lated values provide information on the causes of the malfunction, in case of a known pattern. A 
major issue is that the simulation can take very long if the system behavior is mapped accurately. 
Thus, for a real-time application simplifications may be necessary [8, 13].  
In the example (Fig. 1), the pitch angle is manipulated to 0°, implying the maximum energy trans-
fer. The measured curve can be seen in red. The figure shows the output values by the pitch control 
(not the manipulated true pitch value of 0°). The wind speed is increasing continuously. In order 
to reduce the measured power, the control attempts to increase the pitch more and more. As the 
true pitch remains at 0° the generator speed increases. The efficiency of the generator depends on 
the speed as it feeds to a grid with rotating current of a certain frequency. So the reached speed 
finally leads to decreasing power and the protection system interrupts the operation after 6.6 s 
because of low Voltage, the trace ends prematurely. In parallel, the expected behavior of the un-
manipulated system is simulated with a model, shown in blue. Here the power is regulated at 
3 MW by increasing the pitch angle as long as the wind exceeds the minimum speed required for 
nominal power.  
 
Fig. 1:  Trace from Simulink simulation of a 
wind turbine and trace of parallel 
simulation during runtime. 
Manipulation: pitchangle kept at 0°. 
 
 
Fig. 2:  Trace from Simulink simulation of a wind 
turbine and statical reconstructions of any 
parameter on the others. Manipulation: 
pitchangle kept at 0°. 
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Fig. 3:  Static characteristics (usual characteristic and 
one manipulated)  from Simulink simulation 
of a wind turbine and regions with similar 
behavior. Manipulation: reduced power 
request. 
 
To improve the speed of the analysis, the static interrelationship of observables involved in one 
control loop can be used as simplification. Such possible redundancies in the system can be iden-
tified by the model [11]. For a group of observables that have interrelationships, each variable is 
reconstructed from the others. If the reconstructions differ significantly from the measurement 
this indicates a manipulation, in case of almost bijective dependencies. In the next example 
(Fig. 2), the pitch angle is manipulated to 0°, as in the first example. All reconstructed traces differ 
obviously from the measured one. A manipulation is suggested. A helpful supplement to indentify 
the manipulated parameter would be the safe, secure and independent measurement of the most 
meaningful parameters. 
Another possibility to detect manipulations is to simplify the system by dividing it into regions 
with similar behavior. Rules are defined describing the behavior in each of these regions. The 
information which rules are broken allows conclusions on possible causes. Dependencies between 
the rules are identified. For example, the break of a certain rule results in the breaking of a second 
rule, whereas it does not result from the second rule. So the additional information which regions 
were entered is required. If this method shows an anomaly, it can be evaluated, if the suspicious 
section of trace matches the rules of the next region. 
The third example (Fig.3) shows an unmanipulated characteristic in blue, which lies in the planes. 
The different planes mark regions of common rules. In the yellow region, the pitch angle, as well 
as its derivative, must be at 0, the wind speed is between 5 m/s and 9 m/s, and a positive derivative 
of the wind is associated with a positive derivative of the power. Correspondingly, a negative 
derivative of the wind is accompanied by a negative derivative of the power and a constant wind 
speed with a constant power. For the recording of the red line, the pitch control uses a requested 
power manipulated to a lower value. Both curves are static characteristics. For dynamic traces, 
slight deviations from the characteristic curves occur which, however, have no influence on the 
fulfillment of the rules. It can be seen that the curves in the yellow region agrees with the rules 
for the most part. Only in the upper range a deviation occurs at power and pitch angle. In the blue 
and red regions, deviations occur with pitch angle and power.  
In order to get additional information, the curve from the first point that violates the rules in the 
yellow region is shifted so that it lies on the transition to the blue region. The shifted curve now 
fulfills the rules of the blue range. This leads to the conclusion that the wind turbine behaves 
normally, it only depends on a wrong target power. The displacement of the curve in the direction 
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of a lower wind speed is a logical consequence of the displacement to a lower power and therefore 
only confirms the conclusion. A wrong measurement of the wind force would only require a shift 
on the wind scale.  
Conclusion 
The methods introduced are meant to ensure the integrity of communication and control loops in 
the energy system of the future. On such methods a diagnostic system has to be developed that 
should be realized as an embedded system with very limited communication possibilities, in order 
to ensure the future protection of power plants and automated industrial plants. 
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